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We develop a optimal rules-based interpretation of the ‘three pillars macroeconomic
policy framework’: a combination of a freely ﬂoating exchange rate, an explicit target
for inﬂation, and a mechanism than ensures a stable government debt-GDP ratio
around a speciﬁed long run. We show how such monetary-ﬁscal rules need to be
adjusted to accommodate speciﬁc features of emerging market economies. The model
takes the form of two-blocs, a DSGE emerging small open economy interacting with
the rest of the world and features, in particular, ﬁnancial frictions It is calibrated
using India and US data. Alongside the optimal Ramsey policy benchmark, we model
the three pillars as simple monetary and ﬁscal rules including and both domestic and
CPI inﬂation targeting interest rate rules. A comparison with a ﬁxed exchange rate
regime is made. We ﬁnd that domestic inﬂation targeting is superior to partially
or implicitly (through a CPI inﬂation target) or fully attempting to stabilizing the
exchange rate. Financial frictions require ﬁscal policy to play a bigger role and lead
to an increase in the costs associated with simple rules as opposed to the fully optimal
policy. These policy prescriptions contrast with the monetary-ﬁscal policy stance of
the Indian authorities
JEL Classication: E52, E37, E58
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Over the past decade and prior to the current ﬁnancial crisis, key emerging markets includ-
ing Brazil, Chile, the Czech Republic, Mexico and South Africa have adopted macroeco-
nomic frameworks aimed at making them more resilient to domestic and external economic
shocks. Many of these frameworks are characterized by the ‘three pillars macroeconomic
policy framework’: a combination of a freely ﬂoating exchange rate, an explicit target
for inﬂation over the medium run, and a mechanism that ensures a stable government
debt-GDP ratio around a speciﬁed long run. By contrast, the currency monetary policy
stance of the Indian Reserve Bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market to prevent
what it regards as excessive volatility of the exchange rate. On the ﬁscal side, Central
Government has a rigid ﬁscal deﬁcit target of 3% of GDP irrespective of whether the
economy is in boom or recession. The purpose of this paper is to contrast these implied
policy prescriptions for interest rate and ﬁscal rules.
In this paper we develop a optimal rules-based interpretation of the ‘three pillars’ and
show how such monetary-ﬁscal rules need to be adjusted to accommodate speciﬁc features
of emerging market small open economies (SOEs).1 Such emerging SOEs face substantially
diﬀerent policy issues from those of advanced, larger, more closed economies. The price
of consumer goods depends on the exchange rate and exporting ﬁrms typically set their
prices in foreign currency and bear the risk of currency ﬂuctuations. They often borrow
from international capital markets in foreign currency, so that debt repayment is similarly
aﬀected. Foreign shocks have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the domestic economy. Thus, we expect
monetary and ﬁscal policy prescriptions in a emerging SOE to be fundamentally diﬀerent
from those in a advanced closed economy.
There is a large literature on optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy in response to ex-
ogenous shocks; Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis (2006); Schmitt-Grohe and M.Uribe (2007);
Chadha and Nolan (2007); and Leith and Wren-Lewis (2007) are some recent examples
for the closed economy; Wren-Lewis (2007) provides an insightful overview. We depart
from these works in three principal ways. First, our focus is on a small open economy
(SOE). Second, we want to consider an emerging economy where frictions and distortions
are quantitatively important. To this end, we introduce ﬁnancial frictions in the form of
a ‘ﬁnancial accelerator’. Finally we will impose a zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on
the nominal interest rate that limits its variability and increases the role for ﬁscal sta-
bilization policy, a feature again absent in almost all the literature (Schmitt-Grohe and
1Our focus is in this paper is monetary and ﬁscal rules in ‘normal’ conditions where exogenous shocks
are small but frequent. Building into rules escape clauses for large infrequent credit-crunch type shocks is
beyond the scope of this paper, but we do consider ﬁnancial shocks and their eﬀects on the real economy.
1M.Uribe (2007) is an exception).
We build a two-bloc DSGE emerging markets SOE - rest of the world model to examine
the implications of ﬁnancial frictions for the relative contributions of optimal Ramsey ﬁscal
and monetary stabilization policy and the simple rules that will, as far as possible, mimic
the Ramsey policy. Alongside standard features of SOE economies such as local currency
pricing for exporters, oil imports, our model incorporates liability dollarization, as well
as ﬁnancial frictions including a ﬁnancial accelerator, where capital ﬁnancing is partly or
totally in foreign currency as in Gertler et al. (2003) and Gilchrist (2003)). The model is
calibrated to India and US data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sections 3
and 4 set out the form of monetary and ﬁscal rules under investigation. Section 5 addresses
the requirement that monetary rules should be ‘operational’ in the sense that, in the face of
shocks, the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate is very rarely hit. In
Section 6 we examine the benchmark Ramsey policy as ﬁrst the ﬁnancial accelerator and
then liability dollarization are introduced. In section 7 we derive and compare alternative
simple monetary and ﬁscal policy rules. Section 8 provides concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Our modelling strategy is to start from a fairly standard two-bloc ‘New Open Economy’
micro-founded DSGE model and then proceed to introduce various features appropriate
to an emerging economy such as India. The beneﬁts of this step-by-step approach are two-
fold: ﬁrst, it builds upon a large emerging literature and second, it enables the researcher
to assess both the policy implications and the empirical relevance of each modelling stage.
First the standard model: the two blocs are asymmetric and unequally-sized, each
one with diﬀerent household preferences and technologies. The single (relatively) small
open economy then emerges as the limit when the relative size of the larger bloc tends to
inﬁnity. Households are Ricardian, and work, save and consume tradable goods produced
both at home and abroad. In a Wicksellian framework with a nominal interest rate target
as the monetary instrument, we assume a ‘cashless economy’ and thus ignore seigniorage
from money creation. There are three types of ﬁrms: wholesale, retail and capital pro-
ducers. Wholesale ﬁrms borrow from households to buy capital used in production and
capital producers build new capital in response to the demand of wholesalers. Monopolis-
tic retailers adopt staggered price-setting with both producer and local currency pricing
for exports in the home bloc, but only producer currency pricing in the large foreign bloc.
Households supply a diﬀerentiated factor input which provides a further source of market
2power. In principle we could introduce staggered wage setting, but in accordance with
labour market conditions in India we assume that wages are ﬂexible. Oil imports enter
into consumption and production in both blocs.
With these foundations we now proceed to some important features of emerging mar-
kets. First we introduce an imported oil input into output and consumption which has
an exogenous price in dollars. However our main focus is on nancial frictions. In many
developing countries including India, ﬁrms face signiﬁcant capital market imperfections
when they seek external funds to ﬁnance new investment. Along the lines of Bernanke
et al. (1999), Gertler et al. (2003), Gilchrist (2003) (see also Cespedes et al. (2004)), we
introduce a ‘ﬁnancial accelerator’ in the form of an external ﬁnance premium for whole-
sale ﬁrms that increases with leverage. We assume that part of the the debt of wholesale
ﬁrms is ﬁnanced in foreign currency (dollars), because it is impossible for ﬁrms to borrow
100 percent in domestic currency owing to ‘original sin’ type constraints – a phenomenon
dubbed ‘liability dollarization’. There are two further forms of ﬁnancial frictions: ﬁrst
households face a risk premium when borrowing in world ﬁnancial markets which intro-
duces a ‘national ﬁnancial accelerator’ as in Benigno (2001). Liability dollarization and
the national ﬁnancial accelerator departures add additional dimensions to openness.2 Fi-
nally we assume that a signiﬁcant proportion of households are excluded altogether from
credit markets, do not save and can only consume out of current post-tax and transfer
income.
Details of the model are as follows.
2.1 Households
Normalizing the total population to be unity, there are ν households in the ‘home’, emerg-
ing economy bloc and (1−ν) households in the ‘foreign’ bloc. A representative household












where Et is the expectations operator indicating expectations formed at time t, β is the
household’s discount factor, Ct(h) is a Dixit-Stiglitz index of consumption deﬁned below
in (5), HC,t = hCCt−1 is ‘external habit’, Mt(h) is the end-of-period holding of nominal
domestic money balances, Pt is a Dixit-Stiglitz price index deﬁned in (14) below, and
Lt(h) are hours worked. An analogous symmetric intertemporal utility is deﬁned for the
2See also Batini et al. (2007) for a SOE model with these features and, in addition, transactions
dollarization owing to the assumption that households derive utility from holdings of both domestic and
foreign currency.
3‘foreign’ representative household and the corresponding variables (such as consumption)
are denoted by C∗
t (h), etc.
We incorporate ﬁnancial frictions facing households as in Benigno (2001). There are
two risk-free one-period bonds denominated in the currencies of each bloc with payments












where ϕ(·) captures the cost in the form of a risk premium for home households to hold
foreign bonds, Bt is the aggregate foreign asset position of the economy denominated in
home currency and PH,tYt is nominal GDP. We assume ϕ(0) = 0 and ϕ′ < 0. Rn,t and R∗
n,t
denote the nominal interest rate over the interval [t,t + 1]. The representative household
h must obey a budget constraint:
(1 + τC,t)PtCt(h) + PB,tBH,t(h) + P∗
B,tStBF,t(h) + Mt(h) + TLt
= Wt(h)(1 − τL,t))Lt(h) + BH,t−1(h) + StBF,t−1(h) + Mt−1(h)
+ (1 − τ ,t)Γt(h) (3)
where Wt(h) is the wage rate, TLt are lump-sum taxes net of transfers, τL,t and τ ,t are
labour income and proﬁts tax rates respectively and Γt(h), dividends from ownership of
ﬁrms. In addition, if we assume that households’ labour supply is diﬀerentiated with
elasticity of supply η, then (as we shall see below) the demand for each consumer’s labor






















wage index and average employment respectively.
Let the number of diﬀerentiated goods produced in the home and foreign blocs be n
and n∗ respectively. We assume that the the ratio of households to ﬁrms are the same in
each bloc. It follows that n and n∗ (or ν and ν∗) are measures of size. The per capita
















where µC is the elasticity of substitution between and composite of home and foreign ﬁnal
















































where CH,t(f,h) and CF,t(f,h) denote the home consumption of household h of variety f
produced in blocs H and F respectively and ζ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between
varieties in each bloc. Analogous expressions hold for the foreign bloc which indicated
with a superscript ‘∗’ and we impose ζ = ζ∗ for reasons that become apparent in section
2.2.3.3 Weights in the non-oil consumption baskets in the two blocs are deﬁned by
wZ ≡ 1 −
n∗
n + n∗(1 − ω); w∗
Z ≡ 1 −
n
n + n∗(1 − ω∗) (7)
In (7), ω, ω∗ ∈ [0,1] are a parameters that captures the degree of ‘bias’ in the two blocs.
If ω = ω∗ = 1 we have autarky, while ω = ω∗ = 0 gives us the case of perfect integration.
In the limit as the home country becomes small n → 0 and ν → 0. Hence wZ → ω and
w∗
Z → 1. Thus the foreign bloc becomes closed, but as long as there is a degree of home
bias and ω > 0, the home country continues to consume foreign-produced consumption
goods.
Denote by PH,t(f), PF,t(f) the prices in domestic currency of the good produced by ﬁrm



































3Consistently we adopt a notation where subscript H or F refers to goods H or F produced in the home
and foreign bloc respectively. The presence (for the foreign bloc) or the absence (for the home country)
of a superscript ‘∗’ indicates where the good is consumed or used as an input. Thus C
∗
H;t refers to the
consumption of the home good by households in the foreign bloc. Parameter w and w
∗ refer to the home
and foreign bloc respectively, etc.

























and the domestic consumer price index Pt given by
Pt =
[




wZ(PH,t)1−µZ + (1 − wZ)(PF,t)1−µZ] 1
1−Z (14)
with a similar deﬁnition for the foreign bloc.







PH;t = 1. Then it follows that the real exchange rate RERt =
StP∗
t
Pt . However with local currency pricing the real exchange rate and the terms of trade,




















































Thus if µ = µ∗, then RERt = 1 and the law of one price applies to the aggregate price
indices iﬀ w∗ = 1−w. The latter condition holds if there is no home bias. If there is home
bias, the real exchange rate appreciates (RERt falls) as the terms of trade deteriorates.
We assume ﬂexible wages. Then maximizing (1) subject to (3) and (4), treating habit

































where UC,t, UM,t, and −UL,t are the marginal utility of consumption, money holdings in
the two currencies and the marginal disutility of work respectively. τC,t is a consumption
tax rate. In what follows we assume that this and other all tax rates are held ﬁxed and
only lump-sum taxes of transfers are used for stabilization. Then τC,t = τC,t+1 = τC and
taking expectations of the Keynes-Ramsey rule (??) and its foreign counterpart, we arrive

















In (20), the demand for money balances depends positively on the marginal utility of
consumption and negatively on the nominal interest rate. If, as is common in the literature,
one adopts a utility function that is separable in money holdings, then given the central
bank’s setting of the latter and ignoring seignorage in the government budget constraint
money demand is completely recursive to the rest of the system describing our macro-
model. However separable utility functions are implausible (see Woodford (2003),chapter
3, section 3.4) and following Felices and Tuesta (2006) we will not go down this route.
Finally, in (21) the real disposable wage is proportional to the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure, −
UL;t
UC;t, and the constant of proportionality reﬂects the
market power of households that arises from their monopolistic supply of a diﬀerentiated
factor input with elasticity η.
2.1.1 Rule of Thumb (RT) Households
Suppose now there are two groups of household, a ﬁxed proportion 1 − λ without credit
constraints and the remaining proportion λ who consume out of post-tax income. Let
C1,t(h), W1,t(h) and L1,t(h) be the per capita consumption, wage rate and labour supply
respectively for this latter group. Then the optimizing households are denoted as before
with Ct(h), Wt(h) and Lt(h) replaced with C2,t(h), W2,t(h) and L2,t(h). We then have the
7budget constraint of the RT consumers
Pt(1 + τC,t)C1,t(h) = (1 − τL,t)W1,t(h)L1,t(r) + TL1,t (23)
where TL1,t is net lump-sum transfers received per credit-constrained household. Fol-
lowing Erceg et al. (2005) we further assume that RT households set their wage to be
the average of the optimizing households. Then since RT households face the same
demand schedule as the optimizing ones they also work the same number of hours.
Hence in a symmetric equilibrium of identical households of each type, the wage rate
is given by W1,t(r) = W1,t = W2,t(r) = W2,t = Wt and hours worked per household is
L1,t(h) = L2,t(h) = Lt. The only diﬀerence between the income of the two groups of
households is that optimizing households as owners receive the proﬁts from the mark-up
of domestic monopolistic ﬁrms.












and average consumption per household over the two groups is given by




t etc are similarly deﬁned.
2.2 Firms
There are three types of ﬁrms, wholesale, retail and capital producers. Wholesale ﬁrms
are run by risk-neutral entrepreneurs who purchase capital and employ household labour
to produce a wholesale goods that is sold to the retail sector. The wholesale sector is
competitive, but the retail sector is monopolistically competitive. Retail ﬁrms diﬀeren-
tiate wholesale good at no resource cost and sell the diﬀerentiated (repackaged) goods
to households. The capital goods sector is competitive and converts the ﬁnal good into
capital. The details are as follows.
2.2.1 Wholesale Firms
Wholesale goods are homogeneous and produced by entrepreneurs who combine diﬀeren-


















where we recall that Lt(h) is the labour input of type h, At is an exogenous shock cap-
turing shifts to trend total factor productivity in this sector. 4 Minimizing wage costs
∑ν







Wholesale goods sell at a price PW
H,t in the home country. Equating the marginal product














Let Qt be the real market price of capital in units of total household consumption.
Then noting that proﬁts per period are PW
H,tYt −WtLt −PO,tOILt = α1PW
H,tYt, using (29),
the expected return on capital, acquired at the beginning of period t, net of depreciation,







Kt + (1 − δ)Et[Qt+1]
Qt
(31)
where δ is the depreciation rate of capital. This expected return must be equated with the
expected cost of funds over [t,t+1], taking into account credit market frictions.5 Wholesale
ﬁrms borrow in both home and foreign currency, with exogenously given proportion6 of


















= (1 + Θt)
[








4Following Gilchrist et al. (2002) and Gilchrist (2003), we ignore the managerial input into the produc-
tion process and later, consistent with this, we ignore the contribution of the managerial wage in her net
worth.
5We assume all ﬁnancial returns are taxed at the same rate and therefore do not aﬀect arbitrage
conditions.
6We do not attempt to endogenize the decision of ﬁrms to partially borrow foreign currency; this lies
outside the scope of this paper.
9If φ = 1 or if UIP holds this becomes (1+Θt)Et [1 + Rt]. In (32), RERt ≡
P∗
t St
Pt is the real






−1 is the ex post real interest rate over [t−1,t]






; Θ′(·) > 0, Θ(0) = 0, Θ(∞) = ∞ (33)
where Bt = QtKt − Nt is bond-ﬁnanced acquisition of capital in period t and Nt is the
beginning-of-period t entrepreneurial net worth, the equity of the ﬁrm.7 Note that the ex
post return at the beginning of period t, Rk







Kt−1 + (1 − δ)Qt
Qt−1
(34)
and this can deviate from the ex ante return on capital.
Assuming that entrepreneurs exit with a given probability 1−ξe, net worth accumulates
according to
Nt = ξeVt + (1 − ξe)Dt (35)
where Dt are transfers from exiting to newly entering entrepreneurs continuing, and Vt,





− (1 + Θt−1)
(








A reasonable assumption is that Dt = νVt. Note that in (36), (1 + Rk
t−1) is the ex post
return on capital acquired at the beginning of period t − 1, (1 + Rt−1) is the ex post
real cost of borrowing in home currency and (1 + R∗
t−1) RERt
RERt−1 is the ex post real cost of
borrowing in foreign currency. Also note that net worth Nt at the beginning of period t
is a non-predetermined variable since the ex post return depends on the current market
value Qt, itself a non-predetermined variable.
Along a deterministic balanced growth path (BGP) with balanced trade and therefore
no net overseas assets we have that ¯ Nt = (1 + g) ¯ Nt−1 and 1 + Rk = (1 + Θ)(1 + R) =
1 + Θ)(1 + R∗). Therefore
¯ Nt = (1 + g) ¯ Nt−1 = (ξe + (1 − ξe)ν)¯ Vt = (ξe + (1 − ξe)ν)(1 + Θ)(1 + R) ¯ Nt−1 (37)
7The entrepreneur borrows from a ﬁnancial intermediary that in turn obtains funds from households at
a real ex post cost Rt−1 = (1+Rn;t−1)
Pt
Pt 1. Entrepreneurs can borrow up to KtQt. The return to capital
is subject to idiosyncratic shocks for which the lender pays a monitoring cost to observe. Bernanke et al.
(1999) show that the optimal ﬁnancial contract between a risk-neutral intermediary and entrepreneur takes
the form of a risk premium given by (33). Thus the risk premium is an increasing function of leverage of
the ﬁrm. Following these authors, in the general equilibrium we ignore monitoring costs.
10Thus from (36), given values for ξe, Θ and R, for a BGP the remaining parameter ν must
be set such that (ξe + (1 − ξe)ν)(1 + Θ)(1 + R) = 1 + g.
Exiting entrepreneurs consume Ce
t, the remaining resources, given by
Ce
t = (1 − ξe)(Vt − Dt) = (1 − ξe)(1 − µ)Vt =
(1 − ξe)(1 − ν)
ξe + (1 − ξe)ν
Nt (38)


























Retail ﬁrms are monopolistically competitive, buying wholesale goods and diﬀerentiating
the product at a ﬁxed resource cost F. In a free-entry equilibrium proﬁts are driven to
zero. Retail output for ﬁrm f is then Yt(f) = Y W
t (f)−F where Y W
t is produced according
to production technology (26). We provide a general set-up in which a ﬁxed proportion
1 − θ of retailers set prices in the Home currency (producer currency pricers, PCP) and
a proportion θ set prices in the dollars (local currency pricers, LCP).8 In the model used
for the policy exercises we assume LCP only (θ = 1). Details are as follows:
2.2.3 PCP Exporters
Assume that there is a probability of 1 − ξH at each period that the price of each good
f is set optimally to ˆ PH,t(f). If the price is not re-optimized, then it is held constant.9








ˆ PH,t(f) − PH,t+kMCt+k
]
where Dt,t+k is the discount factor over the interval [t,t + k], subject to a common10
downward sloping demand from domestic consumers and foreign importers of elasticity ζ
8As with the foreign currency borrowing parameter φ, we make no attempt to endogenize the choice of
PCP and LCP.
9Thus we can interpret
1
1−H as the average duration for which prices are left unchanged.
10Recall that we have imposed a symmetry condition ζ = ζ
∗ at this point; i.e., the elasticity of substi-
tution between diﬀerentiated goods produced in any one bloc is the same for consumers in both blocs.
11as in (8) and MCt =
PW
H;t













and by the law of large numbers the evolution of the price index is given by
P
1−ζ
H,t+1 = ξH (PH,t)
1−ζ + (1 − ξH)( ˆ PH,t+1(f))1−ζ (42)
For later use in the evaluation of tax receipts, we require monopolistic proﬁts as a















For good f imported by the home country from PCP foreign ﬁrms the price P
p
F,t(f),









Price setting in export markets by domestic LCP exporters follows is a very similar fashion
to domestic pricing. The optimal price in units of domestic currency is ˆ Pℓ
H,tSt, costs are


















1−ζT + (1 − ξH)( ˆ P∗ℓ
H,t+1(f))1−ζT (45)
Foreign exporters from the large ROW bloc are PCPers so we have
PF,t = StP∗
F,t (46)
Table 1 summarizes the notation used.














Table 1. Notation for Prices
122.2.5 Capital Producers
As in Smets and Wouters (2003), we introduce a delayed response of investment observed
in the data. Capital producers combine existing capital, Kt, leased from the entrepreneurs
to transform an input It, gross investment, into new capital according to
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + (1 − S (It/It−1))It ; S′, S′′ ≥ 0; S(1) = S′(1) = 0 (47)
This captures the ideas that adjustment costs are associated with changes rather than


















where weights in investment are deﬁned as in the consumption baskets, namely
wI = 1 − (1 − n)(1 − ωI); w∗
I = 1 − n(1 − ω∗
I) (49)
with investment price given by
PI,t =
[
wI(PH,t)1−ρI + (1 − wI)(PF,t)1−ρI] 1
1−I (50)
Capital producers choose the optimal combination of domestic and foreign inputs accord-






















which results in the ﬁrst-order condition












2.3 The Government Budget Constraint and Foreign Asset Accumula-
tion
The government issues bonds denominated in home currency. The government budget
identity is given by
PB,tBG,t + Mt = BG,t−1 + PH,tGt − Tt + Mt−1 (53)
11In a balanced growth steady state adjustment costs are associated with change relative to trend so
that the conditions on S(·) along the balanced growth path become S(1 + g) = S
′(1 + g) = 0.
12This ignores leasing costs which Gertler et al. (2003) show to be of second order importance.
13Taxes are levied on labour income, monopolistic proﬁts, consumption and capital re-
turns at rates τL,t, τ , τC,t and τK,t. Then adding lump-sum taxes13 levied on all con-
sumers, TL2,t, and subtracting net lump-sum transfers to the constrained consumers,
TL1,t, per capita total taxation net of transfers is given
Tt = τL,tWtLt + τ ,tΓt + τC,tPtCt − λTL1,t + (1 − λ)TL2,t + τK,tRk
t−1PtQtKt (54)
In what follow we take lump-sum taxes and transfers to be the dynamic ﬁscal instruments
keeping tax rates constant at their steady-state values. For later use we then write Tt in
(54) as a sum of the instrument TI
t = −λTL1,t + (1 − λ)TL2,t and remaining taxes which
change endogenously, TNI
t .
Turning to foreign asset accumulation, let
∑ν
h=1 BF,t(h) = νBF,t be the net holdings
by the household sector of foreign bonds. An convenient assumption is to assume that
home households hold no foreign bonds so that BF,t = 0, and the net asset position of
the home economy Bt = −B∗
H,t; i.e., minus the foreign holding of domestic government
bonds.14 Summing over the household budget constraints (including entrepreneurs and
capital producers), and subtracting (53), we arrive at the accumulation of net foreign
assets:
PB,tBt = Bt−1 + WtLt + Γt + (1 − ξe)PtVt + PtQt(1 − S(Xt))It
− PtCt − PtCe
t − PI,tIt − PH,tGt − PO,tOILt
≡ Bt−1 + TBt (55)
where the trade balance, TBt, is given by the national accounting identity
PH,tYt − PO,tOILt = PtCt + PtCe
t + PI,tIt + PH,tGt + TBt (56)
Terms on the left-hand-side of (56) are oil revenues and the value of net output; on the
right-hand-side are public and private consumption plus investment plus the trade surplus.
So far we have aggregated consumption across constrained and unconstrained con-
sumers. To obtain separately per capita consumption within these groups, ﬁrst consolidate
the budget constraints (53) and (3), to give










13If tax rates are held ﬁxed, then the ‘lump-sum tax’ can be considered to be minus the income tax rate
times the threshold at which labour income tax starts to operate. An decrease in the threshold is then
equivalent to an increase in a lump-sum tax.
14An alternative assumption with the same eﬀect is to assume that and the government issues bonds
denominated in foreign currency (see Medina and Soto (2007)).
14Then using (23) and (55), we arrive at
C2,t = C1,t +
1
1−λ [−TBt + Tt − PH,tGt + (1 − τ ,t)Γt − λTL1,t] − TL2,t
(1 + τC,t)Pt
(57)
In a balanced growth steady state with negative net foreign assets and government debt,
the national and government budget constraints require a primary trade surplus (TB > 0)
and a primary government surplus (T > PHG). Since private sector assets are exclusively
owned by unconstrained consumers this may result in a higher consumption per head
by that group. The same applies to proﬁts from retail ﬁrms since they are assumed to
also be exclusively owned by unconstrained consumers. On the other hand lump-sum
transfers to constrained consumers plus lump-sum taxes on unconstrained consumers,
−λTL1,t + (1 − λ)TL2,t tend to lower the consumption gap.
2.4 The Equilibrium
In equilibrium, ﬁnal goods markets, money markets and the bond market all clear. Equat-
ing the supply and demand of the home consumer good and assuming that government
expenditure, taken as exogenous, goes exclusively on home goods we obtain for the ﬁnal
goods market15
Yt = CH,t + Ce










Shocks are to technology in wholesale goods sectors, government spending in the two
blocs, the interest rate rule in the foreign bloc and to the risk premia facing unconstrained
households, in the modiﬁed UIP condition (22) and facing wholesale ﬁrms in their external
ﬁnance premium given by (33).
This completes the model. Given nominal interest rates Rn,t,R∗
n,t the money supply
is ﬁxed by the central banks to accommodate money demand. By Walras’ Law we can
dispense with the bond market equilibrium conditions. Then the equilibrium is deﬁned
at t = 0 as stochastic sequences C1,t, C2,t, Ct, Ce
t, CH,t, CF,t, PH,t, PF,t, Pt, PC,t, Mt,
BH,t = BG,t, BF,t, Wt, Yt, Lt, P0
H,t, PI
t , Kt, It, Qt, Vt, foreign counterparts C∗
1,t, etc, RERt,
and St, given the monetary instruments Rn,t, R∗
n,t, the ﬁscal instruments and exogenous
processes.
2.5 Specialization of The Household's Utility Function
The choice of utility function must be chosen to be consistent with the balanced growth
path (henceforth BGP) set out in previous sections. As pointed out in Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (2004), chapter 9, this requires a careful choice of the form of the utility as a
15Note that all aggregates, Yt, CH;t, etc are expressed in per capita (household) terms.
15function of consumption and labour eﬀort. As in Gertler et al. (2003), it is achieved by a




















and where labour supply, Lt(h), is measured as a proportion of a day, normalized at unity,
satisﬁes this requirement.16 For this function, UL > 0 so that consumption and money
holdings together, and leisure (equal to 1 − Lt(h)) are substitutes.
2.6 State Space Representation
We linearize around a deterministic zero inﬂation, zero net private sector debt, balanced










































where zt is a vector of predetermined exogenous variables, xt are non-predetermined vari-
ables, and ot is a vector of outputs.17 Matrices A, B, etc are functions of model parameters.
Rational expectations are formed assuming an information set {z1,s,z2,s,xs}, s ≤ t, the
model and the monetary rule. Details of the linearization are provided in Batini et al.
(2010).
2.7 The Small Open Economy
Following Felices and Tuesta (2006), we can now model a SOE by letting its relative size in
the world economy n → 0 whilst retaining its linkages with the rest of the world (ROW).
16A BGP requires that the real wage, real money balances and consumption grow at the same rate at
the steady state with labour supply constant. It is straightforward to show that (59) has these properties.
17We deﬁne all lower case variables as proportional deviations from this baseline steady state except for






where X is the baseline steady state. For variables expressing a rate of change over time such as the
nominal interest rate rn;t and inﬂation rates, xt = Xt − X.
16In particular the demand for exports is modelled in a consistent way that retains its
dependence on shocks to the home and ROW economies. We now need a fully articulated
model of the ROW. From (7) we have that w → ω and w∗ → 1 as n → 0. Similarly for
investment we have wI → ωI and w∗
I → 1 as n → 0. It seems at ﬁrst glance then that the
ROW becomes closed and therefore exports from our SOE must be zero. However this
is not the case. Consider the linearized form of the output demand equations in the two
blocs:




Z,t + αI,Hit + α∗
I,Hi∗
t + αGgt
+ [µ(αC,H + αe
C,H)(1 − wZ) + µ∗α∗
C,Hw∗
















Z) + µαC,FwZ + ρ∗
Iα∗
I,F(1 − w∗
I) + ρIαI,FwI]τt (63)



























































(1 − n)Y ∗ → 0
αe
C,F =
(1 − w)(1 − ξe)nkky
ξe
nY
















(1 − n)Y ∗ → 0
Thus we see that from the viewpoint of the ROW our SOE becomes invisible, but not
vice versa. Exports to and imports from the ROW are now modelled explicitly in a way
17that captures all the interactions between shocks in the ROW and the transmission to the
SOE.
2.8 Calibration
2.8.1 Home Bias Parameters
The bias parameters we need to calibrate are: ω, ω∗, ωI and ω∗
I. Let in the steady state
Ce = seC be consumption by entrepreneurs, and cy = C
Y . Let csimports be the GDP share
of imported consumption of the foreign (F) consumption good. Let csexports be the GDP




























Similarly for investment deﬁne isimports to be the GDP share of imported investment of
the F investment and isexports be the GDP share of exports of H investment good. Then
with iy = I




















in the steady state. We linearize around a zero trade balance TB = 0, so we require
csimports + isimports = csexports + isexports (64)
in which case αC,H + αe
C,H + α∗
C,H + αI,H + α∗
I,H = cy + iy as required. Thus we can use
trade data for consumption and investment goods, consumption shares and relative per
capita GDP to calibrate the bias parameters ω, ω∗, ωI and ω∗
I. We need the home country
biases elsewhere in the model, but for the ROW we simply put ω∗ = ω∗
I = 1 everywhere
else, so these biases are not required as such.
2.8.2 Calibration of Household Preference Parameters
We now show how observed data on the household wage bill as a proportion of total
consumption, real money balances as a proportion of consumption and estimates of the
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption with respect to total money balances can
be used to calibrate the preference parameters ϱ, b and θ in (59).










PC is the household wage bill as a proportion of total consumption, which is











Z is the ‘eﬀective-consumption’ –real money balance ratio (allowing for
external habit). From (59), the elasticity the marginal utility of consumption with respect




(1 − b)[(1 − ϱ)(1 − σ) − 1 + 1
θ
bcz θ−1
θ + 1 − b
(67)
From the ﬁrst-order conditions in the steady state (??) and (??) with Rn = R∗









Thus given σ, β, g, hC,
W(1−L)
PC , cz and Ψ, equations (65)–(68) can be solved for ϱ, b and
θ. The calculations for these parameters for the calibrated values of σ, β, g, hC,
W(1−L)
PC
and cz are out in Batini et al. (2010).18 of Ψ ∈ [0,0.01]. Since Ψ > 0 we impose on our
calibration the property that money and consumption are complements.
2.8.3 Remaining Parameters
As far as possible parameters are chosen based on quarterly data for India. Full details
are provided in Batini et al. (2010). Estimates for shocks are taken from Gabriel et al.
(2011). Elsewhere the parameters reﬂect broad characteristics of emerging economies. For
emerging economies more generally and for parameters related to the ﬁnancial accelerator
we use Yang (2008), Gertler et al. (2003) and Bernanke et al. (1999). The rest of the world
is represented by US data. Here we draw upon Levin et al. (2006). In places we match
Indian with European estimates using Smets and Wouters (2003).
3 Monetary Policy Interest Rate Rules
In line with the literature on open-economy interest rate rules (see, for example, Benigno
and Benigno (2004)), we assume that the central bank in the emerging market bloc has
18See Woodford (2003), chapter 2 for a discussion of this parameter.
19three options : (i) set the nominal interest to keep the exchange rate ﬁxed (ﬁxed exchange
rates, ‘FIX’); (ii) set the interest rate to track deviations of domestic or CPI inﬂation from
a predetermined target (inﬂation targeting under fully ﬂexible exchange rates, ‘FLEX(D)’
or ‘FLEX(C)’); or, ﬁnally (iii) follow a hybrid regime, in which the nominal interest rates
responds to both inﬂation deviations from target and exchange rate deviations from a cer-
tain level (managed ﬂoat, ‘HYB’). Many emerging market countries follow one or another
of these options and most are likely to in the near future. Formally, the rules are:
Fixed Exchange Rate Regime, `FIX'. In a simpliﬁed model without an exchange
rate premium analyzed in section 4 we show this is implemented by
rn,t = r∗
n,t + θsst (69)
where any θs > 0 is suﬃcient to the regime. In our full model with an exchange rate pre-
mium, we implement ‘FIX’ as a ‘HYB’ regime below, with feedback coeﬃcients chosen to
minimize a loss function that includes a large penalty on exchange rate variability. (Note
that values for the loss function reported below remove the latter contribution).
Ination Targets under a Fully Flexible Exchange Rate, `FLEX(D)' or `FLEX(C)'.
This takes the form of Taylor rule with domestic or CPI inﬂation and output targets:
rn,t = ρrn,t−1 + θππH,t + θyyt (70)
rn,t = ρrn,t−1 + θππt + θyyt (71)
where ρ ∈ [0,1] is an interest rate smoothing parameter.
Managed Float, `HYB'. In this rule the exchange rate response is direct rather than
indirect as in the CPI inﬂation rule, (71):19
rn,t = ρrn,t−1 + θππH,t + θyyt + θsst (72)
In all cases we assume that the central bank and the ﬁscal authorities in the emerging
market bloc enjoy full credibility. Although this assumption may have been considered
heroic a few years ago, today there are several emerging market countries that have suc-
ceeded in stabilizing inﬂation at low levels and have won the trust of, including economies
19Rule (71) describes one of many possible speciﬁcations of a managed ﬂoat, namely one where the
central bank resists deviations of the exchange rate from a certain level–considered to be the equilibrium–
as well as deviations of inﬂation from target and output from potential. An equally plausible speciﬁcation
involves a feedback on the rate of change of the exchange rate, in which case the central bank aim is to
stabilize exchange rate volatility, i.e. the pace at which the domestic currency appreciates or depreciates
over time. For a discussion see Batini et al. (2003). To limit the number of simulations and results to be
compared, here we limit ourselves to one speciﬁcation only.
20with a history of high or hyper-inﬂation (e.g. Brazil, Israel, Peru and Mexico, among
others. See Batini et al. (2006). Accounting for imperfect credibility of the central bank
remains nonetheless important for many other emerging market countries, and can lead to
higher stabilization costs than under full credibility (under inﬂation targeting and ﬂoat-
ing exchange rate, see Aoki and Kimura (2007) or even sudden stops and ﬁnancial crises
(under ﬁxed exchange rates, see IMF (2005)).
4 Fiscal Rules
First we rewrite the government budget identity (53) in terms of the market price of bonds
ˆ BG,t = P∗
B,tBG,t to give
ˆ BG,t = (1 + Rn,t−1) ˆ BG,t−1 + Gt − Tt ≡ ˆ BG,t−1 − FSt (73)
where FSt is the ﬁscal surplus. In terms of GDP ratios this can be written as
ˆ BG,t
PH,tYt
















deﬁning a growth-adjusted real interest rate Rg,t−1 over the interval [t − 1,t] by
1 + Rg,t−1 =
1 + Rn,t−1








Given a target steady-state government debt-to-GDP ratio
^ BG
PHY , the steady state pri-




















Thus if inﬂation and growth are zero the steady state ﬁscal surplus is zero, but if inﬂation
and/or growth are positive, then a steady state scal decit (but positive primary surplus)
is sustainable.
In the exercises that follow ﬁscal policy is carried out in using a component of taxa-
tion as the instrument, keeping government spending exogenous. Since it is desirable to
avoid frequent changes of distortionary taxes, our chosen tax instrument consists of lump-
sum tax receipts paid by Ricardian households (1 − λ)TL2,t minus lump-sum transfers to
constrained households λTL1,t. Thus we have
TI
t = (1 − λ)TL2,t − λTL1,t (78)
21All other tax rates are kept ﬁxed at their steady-state values.20
We consider tax rules that acknowledge the following: while interest rates can be set
very frequently, often monthly, ﬁscal policy is set less frequently and involves an imple-
mentation lag. We assume in fact that the ﬁscal authority set tax rates every two periods
(quarters in our calibration) whereas the central bank changes the nominal interest rate
every period. This means in quarter t, a state-contingent ﬁscal policy can only respond
to outcomes in quarter t − 1 or earlier. It follows that the ﬁscal instrument Taylor-type
(ﬁxed feedback) commitment rule that is compatible with a two-period ﬁscal plan must
take one of two forms
TI
t = f (Xt−1) (79)
TI
t = f (Et−1(Xt)) (80)
where Xt is a vector of macroeconomic variables that deﬁne the simple ﬁscal rule. We can












TI , tl1,t = (TL1,t − TF1)/TF1 etc are proportional changes in tax receipts
relative to steady state values.
What now remains is to assign the adjustment of the lump-sum tax on the Ricardian
group 2 and the transfer to the constrained group 1. We assume a ‘shared burden or gain
principle’ that as lump-sum rates rise (or fall) then transfers must fall (or rise). Thus we
have
tl1,t − pH,t−1 = −
k
1 − k
(tl2,t − pH,t−1) (82)
tl1,t − Et−1pH,t = −
k
1 − k
(tl2,t − Et−1pH,t) (83)
corresponding to forms (79) and (80) respectively. Thus ﬁscal expansion (contraction)
involves reducing (increasing) real taxes for group 2 and increasing (reducing) real transfers
to group 1. If k = 0 all the adjustment is borne by the unconstrained second group and if
k = 1 by the constrained ﬁrst group. In our results we put k = 0.5. It remains to specify
the rule for tl2,t.
20An alternative instrument choice would be government spending. In our welfare-based analysis, this
would require us to model the welfare implications of changes in government spending. We have chosen
not to undertake this approach, but we anticipate that the results would not change dramatically.
22The form of our ﬁscal rule is fairly standard: real tax receipts as a proportion of GDP
feeds back on government debt as a proportion of GDP,
^ BG;t





PHY , the ﬁscal rule in linearized form corresponding to (79) and (80) is
tl2,t = pH,t−1 + (1 + αy)yt−1 + αbgbG,t−1 (84)
tl2,t = Et−1[pH,t + (1 + αy)yt + αbgbG,t] (85)
5 Imposing the Nominal Interest Rate Zero Lower Bound
We now modify our interest-rate rules to approximately impose an interest rate ZLB so
that this event hardly ever occurs. Although so far only a few emerging market countries
have experienced deﬂationary episodes (Peru and Israel in 2007 are examples of this), most
inﬂation-targeting emerging market countries have chosen low single digit inﬂation targets
(see IMF, 2005), which makes the design of rules robust to ZLB problems germane. Our





t]′ and Q is a symmetric matrix. As in Woodford (2003), chapter 6, the
ZLB constraint is implemented by modifying the single period welfare loss to Lt +wrr2
n,t.
Then following Levine et al. (2007), the policymaker’s optimization problem is to choose
wr and the unconditional distribution for rn,t (characterized by the steady state variance)
shifted to the right about a new non-zero steady state inﬂation rate and a higher nominal
interest rate, such that the probability, p, of the interest rate hitting the lower bound is
very low. This is implemented by calibrating the weight wr for each of our policy rules
so that z0(p)σr < Rn where z0(p) is the critical value of a standard normally distributed
variable Z such that prob (Z ≤ z0) = p, Rn = 1
β(1+guc) −1+π∗ is the steady state nominal
interest rate, σ2
r = var(rn) is the unconditional variance and π∗ is the new steady state
inﬂation rate. Given σr the steady state positive inﬂation rate that will ensure rn,t ≥ 0
with probability 1 − p is given by21







21If the ineﬃciency of the steady-state output is negligible, then π
∗ ≥ 0 is a credible new steady state
inﬂation rate. Note that in our LQ framework, the zero interest rate bound is very occasionally hit.
Then interest rate is allowed to become negative, possibly using a scheme proposed by Gesell (1934) and
Keynes (1936). Our approach to the ZLB constraint (following Woodford, 2003) in eﬀect replaces it with
a nominal interest rate variability constraint which ensures the ZLB is hardly ever hit. By contrast the
work of a number of authors including Adam and Billi (2007), Coenen and Wieland (2003), Eggertsson
and Woodford (2003) and Eggertsson (2006) study optimal monetary policy with commitment in the face
of a non-linear constraint it ≥ 0 which allows for frequent episodes of liquidity traps in the form of it = 0.
23In our linear-quadratic framework we can write the intertemporal expected welfare loss
at time t = 0 as the sum of stochastic and deterministic components, Ω0 = ˜ Ω0 + ¯ Ω0.
Note that ¯ Ω0 incorporates in principle the new steady state values of all the variables;
however the NK Phillips curve being almost vertical, the main extra term comes from the
π2 term in (??). By increasing wr we can lower σr thereby decreasing π∗ and reducing
the deterministic component, but at the expense of increasing the stochastic component
of the welfare loss. By exploiting this trade-oﬀ, we then arrive at the optimal policy that,
in the vicinity of the steady state, imposes the ZLB constraint, rt ≥ 0 with probability
1 − p.
6 The Financial Accelerator and Model Variants
We parameterize the model according to three alternatives, ordered by increasing degrees
of frictions:
• Model I: no ﬁnancial accelerator and no liability dollarization. (χθ = χ∗
θ = 0,
Θ = Θ∗ = 0, ϵp = ϵ∗
p = 0, φ = 1). This is a fairly standard small open-economy
model similar to many in the New Keynesian open-economy literature with the only
non-standard features being a non-separable utility function in money balances, con-
sumption, and leisure consistent with a balanced growth path and a fully articulated
ROW bloc;
• Model II: ﬁnancial accelerator (FA) only; (χθ,χ∗
θ < 0, Θ,Θ∗ > 0, ϵp,ϵ∗
p ̸= 0,
φ = 1).
• Model III: ﬁnancial accelerator (FA) and liability dollarization (LD), assuming that
ﬁrms borrow a fraction of their ﬁnancing requirements 1−φ ∈ [0,1] in dollars.(χθ,χ∗
θ <
0, Θ,Θ∗ > 0, ϵp,ϵ∗
p ̸= 0, φ ∈ [0,1))
To understand how the transmission of policy and shocks for diﬀerent levels of frictions
and dollarization, we need ﬁrst to take a step back and illustrate some of the mechanisms
driving the real exchange rate, and the behavior of net worth of the wholesale ﬁrms sector.
6.1 Departures from UIP
Movements in the real exchange rate (and the related terms of trade) are critical for
understanding our results. Linearization of the modiﬁed UIP condition (22) gives
rert = Etrert+1 + Et(r∗
t − rt) − δrbF,t + ϵUIP,t (87)
24Solving (87) forward in time we see that the real exchange rate is a sum of future expected
real interest rate diﬀerentials with the ROW plus a term proportional to the sum of future
expected net liabilities plus a sum of expected future shocks ϵUIP,t. The real exchange
will depreciate (a rise in rert) if the sum of expected future interest rate diﬀerentials are
positive and/or the sum of expected future net liabilities are positive and/or a positive
shock to the risk premium, ϵUIP,t occurs.
6.2 The Financial Accelerator
Also crucial to the understanding of the eﬀects of the FA and LD is the behaviour of the















(1 + R)θt−1 + (1 + Θ)(φrt−1 + (1 − φ)(r∗
t−1 + (1 + R)(rert − rert−1)
]]
(88)
where the ex post real interest rates in period t − 1 are in linearized form deﬁned as
rt−1 = rn,t−1 − (1 + R)πt (89)
rt−1
∗ = r∗
n,t−1 − (1 + R)π∗
t (90)
and where the ex ante cost of capital is given by rk
t−1. In (88) since leverage 1
nk > 1 we can
see that net worth increases with the ex post return on capital at the beginning of period t,
rk
t−1, and decreases with the risk premium θt−1 charged in period t−1 and the the ex post
cost of capital in home currency and dollars, φrt−1+(1−φ)(r∗
t−1+(1+R)(rert−rert−1)),
noting that (rert − rert−1) is the real depreciation of the home currency.















Thus net worth falls if Tobin’s Q falls and if some borrowing is in dollars (φ < 1), we see
that a depreciation of the real exchange rate (rer1 > 0) brings about a further drop in net
worth. However an appreciation of the real exchange rate (rer1 < 0) will oﬀset the drop
in net worth. Finally net worth also falls the domestic and foreign inﬂation rates fall and
thereby increase the ex post real interest rates and therefore the ex post cost of capital.
If net worth falls, output also falls through two channels: ﬁrst, a drop in Tobin’s Q and
a subsequent fall in investment demand and second, through a reduction in consumption
demand by entrepreneurs.
25Finally we conﬁrm that for a ﬁxed exchange rate regime with rn,t = r∗
n,t (i.e., no
ﬁnancial friction in the international bond market) liability dollarization has no impact
on net worth. For this regime rert = p∗
t − pt and therefore ∆rert = π∗
t − πt. Then it is














[(1 + R)θt−1 + (1 + Θ)rt−1]
]
(92)
which corresponds to the accumulation of net worth in the absence of LD.
6.3 A Credit Crunch: Impulse Responses to a Risk Premium Shock
Further insights into monetary and ﬁscal policy transmission mechanisms with a ﬁnancial
accelerator can be obtained from impulses following an unanticipated 1% risk premium
shock with AR1 process ϵP,t+1 = 0.95ϵP,t. We conﬁne ourselves to very simple ad hoc
rules of the form
rn,t = ρrn,t−1 + (1 − ρ)(θππH,t + θyyt) (93)
tl2,t = pH,t + αbgbG,t−1 (94)
tl1,t = pH,t (95)
Thus the real transfers to non-Ricardian households are held ﬁxed and the implementation
lag problem is ignored. Figure 1 shows various impulse response functions for the three
model variants. For model III with LD we choose a modest degree of foreign currency
borrowing with φ = 0.9. Fiscal policy only impacts on government debt and is otherwise
independent of the parameter αbg. For the monetary Taylor rule we choose the following
parameters: ρ = 0.74, θπ = 1.67, θy = 0.39 which are in the standard range for estimated
rules.
Following the 1% risk premium shock (ϵP,0 = 1) there is an immediate output rise
which is driven by the immediate increase in demand following the fall in the terms of
trade. This occurs because the commitment rule promises a drawn out period where
the nominal interest rate is below the foreign rate and so the nominal exchange rate
depreciates. The increase in the cost of capital drives Tobin’s Q down and investment
falls. However installation costs ensure this negative demand eﬀect is gradual; after a few
quarters it begins to dominate the terms of trade eﬀect on demand and output starts to
fall. Net worth falls as a result of the increase in the cost of capital and the FA accentuates
both these eﬀects. The FA plus the LD accentuates these further and in turn ’accelerates’
the fall in output and investment.
267 Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy with Financial Fric-
tions
How do ﬁnancial frictions in emerging market economies aﬀect the transmission mechanism
of monetary and ﬁscal policy and the subsequent contributions of each to stabilization in
the face of shocks? To answer this question we parameterize three representations of
the model with increasing frictions and solve them subject to the corresponding optimal
monetary and ﬁscal policy rules based on maximizing the household’s utility. This then
provides a benchmark against which to assess the welfare implications of the ﬁxed-exchange
rate regime and various Taylor-type ﬂexible exchange rate rules alongside the ﬁscal policy.
7.1 The Welfare Criteria
We adopt a linear-quadratic framework for the optimization problem facing the monetary
authority. This is particularly convenient as we can then summarize outcomes in terms of
unconditional (asymptotic) variances of macroeconomic variables and the local stability
and determinacy of particular rules. The framework also proves useful for addressing the
issue of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
Following Woodford (2003), we adopt a ‘small distortions’ quadratic approximation
to the household’s single period utility which is accurate as long as the zero-inﬂation
steady state is close to the social optimum. There are three distortions that result in the
steady state output being below the social optimum: namely, output and labour mar-
ket distortions from monopolistic competition and distortionary taxes required to pay for
government-provided services. Given our calibration these features would make our distor-
tions far from small. However there is a further distortion, external habit in consumption,
that in itself raises the equilibrium steady state output above the social optimum. If the
habit parameter hC is large enough the two sets of eﬀects can cancel out and thus justify
our small distortions approximation. In fact this is the case in our calibration.22
Results obtained below are for a single-period quadratic approximation Lt = y′
tQyt
obtained numerically following the procedure set out in Batini et al. (2010). Insight into
the result can be gleaned from the special case where there are no oil inputs into production
or consumption. Then the quadratic approximation to the household’s intertemporal









22See Levine et al. (2007) and Levine et al. (2008) for a discussion of these issues. The former paper















+ wk(kt−1 − lt)2 − wayytat + wciτcitτt + wclsτclstτt + wππ2
H,t (97)
cit ≡ µω(1 − ω)cyct + µ(1 − ω∗)cyc∗













and the weights wc, wτ, etc are deﬁned in Batini et al. (2010). Thus from (97) welfare is
reduced as a result of volatility in consumption adjusted to external habit, ct−hCct−1; the
terms of trade, τt, labour supply lt, domestic inﬂation πH,t and foreign shocks. There are
also some covariances that arise from the procedure for the quadratic approximation of the
loss function. The policymaker’s problem at time t = 0 is then to minimize (96) subject
to the model in linear state-space form given by (61), initial conditions on predetermined
variables z0 and the Taylor rule followed by the ROW. Our focus is on stabilization policy
in the face of stochastic shocks, so we set z0 = 0.23 The monetary instruments is the
nominal interest rate and the ﬁscal instrument consists of lump-sum taxes net of transfers.
By conﬁning ﬁscal policy to lump-sum taxes on Ricardian households only we eliminate
its stabilization contribution; this we refer to as ‘monetary policy alone’. Details of the
optimization procedure are provided in Levine et al. (2007).
We subject all three variants of the model to eight exogenous and independent shocks:
total factor productivity (at), government spending (gt) in both blocs; the external risk
premium facing ﬁrms, ϵP,t in the home country; an oil shock; a risk premium shock to
the modiﬁed UIP condition, ϵUIP,t; and a shock to the foreign interest rate rule ϵ∗
R,t. The
foreign bloc is fully articulated, so the eﬀect of these shocks impacts on the domestic
economy through changes in the demand for exports, though since the domestic economy
is small, there is no corresponding eﬀect of domestic shocks on the ROW.
7.2 Policy in the Foreign Bloc
The foreign bloc is closed from its own viewpoint so we can formulate its optimal policy
without any strategic considerations. Since our focus is on the home country we choose
a standard model without a FA in the foreign bloc and very simple monetary and ﬁscal
23That is we choose the conditional welfare in the vicinity of the steady state as our criteria. It is in this
sense that our policy exercise is for ‘normal times’.




















Maximizing the quadratic discounted loss function in the four parameters ρ∗ ∈ [0,1],
θ∗
π ∈ [1,10],24 α∗
y, α∗
bg ∈ [0,∞] and imposing a ZLB constraint in a way described in detail
below for the home country, we obtain for the calibration in that bloc: ρ∗ = 1, θ∗
π = 10,
θ∗
y = 0 and α∗
bg = 0.87. The optimized monetary rule then is of a diﬀerence or ‘integral’
form that aggressively responds to any deviation of inﬂation from its zero baseline but
does not react to deviations of output.25
7.3 Optimal Policy without a ZLB Constraint
With the foreign bloc completely speciﬁed we turn to policy in the home country. Table 2
sets out the essential features of the outcome under optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy and
their relative contributions to stabilization. There are no ZLB considerations at this stage.
We report the the conditional welfare loss from ﬂuctuations in the vicinity of the steady
state for optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy and for monetary policy alone as we progress
from model I without a ﬁnancial accelerator (FA) to model III with the FA alongside
liability dollarization (LD). We also report the long-run variance of the interest rate.







I 3.26 2.35 3.35 2.82 0.006
II 3.48 5.01 3.97 4.08 0.034
III 13.92 8.38 15.34 7.89 0.099
Table 2. Welfare Outcomes under Optimal Policy: No ZLB Constraint
To assess the contribution of ﬁscal stabilization policy we calculate the welfare loss
diﬀerence between monetary policy alone (ΩM
0 ) and monetary and ﬁscal policy together
(ΩMF






(1 − ϱ)(1 − hC)cy
× 10−2 (%) (101)
24We restrict our search to π
∗
 ∈ [1,10]: the lower bound ensures the rule satisﬁes the ‘Taylor Principle’
for all ρ and the imposed upper bound avoids large initial jumps in the nominal interest rate.
25The latter feature is a common one in the DSGE literature - see, for example, Schmitt-Grohe and
M.Uribe (2005).
29The results appear to indicate that the stabilization role of ﬁscal policy is rather small,
but increases as ﬁnancial frictions are introduced. At most in model III with both a FA
and LD the consumption equivalent contribution of ﬁscal policy is at most around 0.1%.
However this conclusion is misleading because we have ignored the ZLB constraint. The
high variances reported in Table 1 indicate a very frequent violation of this constraint in
the model economies under these optimal policies.
7.4 Imposing the ZLB
Tables 3 imposes the ZLB constraint as described in the previous section. We ﬁrst consider
monetary policy alone. We choose p = 0.001. Given wr, denote the expected inter-
temporal loss (stochastic plus deterministic components) at time t = 0 by Ω0(wr). This
includes a term penalizing the variance of the interest rate which does not contribute
to utility loss as such, but rather represents the interest rate lower bound constraint.
Actual utility, found by subtracting the interest rate term, is given by Ω0(0). The steady-
state inﬂation rate, π∗, that will ensure the lower bound is reached only with probability
p = 0.001 is computed using (86). Given π∗, we can then evaluate the deterministic
component of the welfare loss, ¯ Ω0. Since in the new steady state the real interest rate is
unchanged, the steady state involving real variables are also unchanged, so from (97) we
can write ¯ Ω0(0) = wππ∗2.26
The optimal policy under the constraint that the ZLB is violated with a probability
p = 0.001 per period (in our quarterly model, once every 250 years) occurs when we put
wr = 3.75 and the steady state quarterly inﬂation rises to π∗ = 0.29.
wr σ2
r ˜ Ω0 π∗ ¯ Ω0 Ω0
0.001 2.82 3.35 2.59 12.84 16.19
1.00 1.84 3.57 1.62 5.04 8.61
2.00 1.32 3.94 1.00 1.90 5.85
3.00 1.00 4.33 0.55 0.59 4.92
3.25 0.94 4.23 0.46 0.41 4.83
3.50 0.88 4.52 0.37 0.27 4.79
3.75 0.83 4.61 0.29 0.17 4.77
4.00 0.79 4.70 0.22 0.09 4.79
Table 3. Optimal Policy with a ZLB Constraint: Monetary Policy Only for
Model I
26The ex ante optimal deterministic welfare loss that results from guiding the economy from a zero-
inﬂation steady state to π = π
∗ diﬀer from ¯ Ω0(0) (but not by much because the steady-state contributions
by far outweighs the transitional one)
30Notation: π∗ = max[z0(p)σr − ( 1
β(1+guc) − 1) × 100,0] = max[3.00σr − 2.44,0] with p =
0.001 probability of hitting the ZLB and β = 0.99, guc = −0.014. ¯ Ω = 1
2wππ∗2 = 3.829π∗2.
Ω = ˜ Ω + ¯ Ω = stochastic plus deterministic components of the welfare loss.
Table 4 repeats this exercise for monetary and ﬁscal policy together. With the bene-
ﬁt of ﬁscal stabilization policy the ZLB constraint is now more easily imposed at values
wr = 0.5 and without any rise in the inﬂation rate from its zero baseline value. Figure 1
presents the same results in graphical form with Figure 2 providing analogous results for
Model III.
wr σ2
r ˜ Ω0 π∗ ¯ Ω0 Ω0
0.001 2.35 3.25 2.16 8.93 12.18
0.25 0.86 3.26 0.33 0.21 3.47
0.50 0.55 3.27 0 0 3.27
0.75 0.40 3.29 0 0 3.29
1.00 0.31 3.30 0 0 3.30
Table 4. Optimal Commitment with a ZLB Constraint. Monetary Plus Fiscal
Policy for Model I
Finally in this subsection we return to the question of how much stabilization role there
is for ﬁscal policy, but now with the ZLB imposed. Table 5 recalculates the consumption
equivalent contribution of ﬁscal stabilization with a ZLB. We now ﬁnd this contribution
to be signiﬁcant, rising from ce = 0.10% to ce = 0.64% as we move from Model I to Model
III.
Model M+F M cMF
e
Ω0 σ2
r π∗ Ω0 σ2
r π∗
I 3.27 0.55 0.00 4.77 0.84 0.29 0.104
II 3.74 0.69 0.05 6.98 1.00 0.57 0.225
III 14.90 0.72 0.10 24.19 1.20 0.85 0.644
Table 5. Welfare Outcomes under Optimal Policy: ZLB Constraint
















IMPOSITION OF ZLB: M+F POLICY IN MODEL I
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Figure 1: Imposition of ZLB: Model I














IMPOSITION OF ZLB: M+F POLICY IN MODEL III


































IMPOSITION OF ZLB: M POLICY ONLY IN MODEL III




















Figure 2: Imposition of ZLB: Model III
328 The Performance of Optimized Simple Rules
The optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy with commitment considered up to now can be
implemented as feedback rules but, as now acknowledged in the literature, the form these
take is complex and would not be easy to monitor (see for example, Levine and Currie
(1987), Currie and Levine (1993), Woodford (2003)). This point has added force when
the need for a planning horizon of more than one period for ﬁscal policy is introduced into
policy design. We therefore turn to simple rules and examine the ranking of various options
and the extent to which they can match the fully optimal benchmark. For monetary
policy we examine two of the options discussed in section 3: FLEX(D) where the nominal
interest rate responds to current domestic inﬂation, πH,t and output, yt, as in (70); and
the ﬁxed exchange rate regime as in (69). In the ﬁrst set of exercises the ﬁscal rule is the
conventional type of the form (82) (with k = 0.5) and (84) which allow tax changes to
be planned two periods ahead. We now maximize the quadratic discounted loss function






r π∗ [ρ, θπ, θy, αbg, αy] Ω0 σ2
r π∗ [ρ, θπ, θy]
I 5.05 0.86 0.34 [1.0,10.0,0.00,0.67,3.08] 5.87 0.96 0.50 [1.0,10.0,0.05] 0.06 0.12
II 13.18 1.74 1.51 [1.0,10.0,0.05,3.99,1.86] 13.65 1.77 1.55 [1.0,10.0,0.01] 0.03 0.66
III 44.75 3.64 3.28 [1.0,4.49,0.30,5.0,2.63] 58.21 4.68 4.05 [1.0,7.84,0.00] 0.93 2.07
Table 7. Welfare Outcomes under Optimized Simple Rules: FLEX(D) with a
Fiscal Rule. Models I, II and III.
Table 7 summarizes the outcomes under this combination of rules. In addition to
the the measure cMF
e which as before quantiﬁes the the contribution to welfare of ﬁscal
stabilization in consumption equivalent terms, we provide a further measure of the costs of
simplicity as opposed to implementing the fully optimal benchmark. Denoting the latter






(1 − ϱ)(1 − hC)cy
× 10−2 (%) (102)
Using this measure we see from Table 7 that the ability of the optimized simple rule
to closely match the fully optimal benchmark deteriorates sharply as ﬁnancial frictions
33are introduced rising from 0.12% in Model I to 0.66% and 2.07% in Models II and III
respectively. The primary reason for this lies in the existence of a lower bound on σ2
r as
wr is increased. This is demonstrated in Figures 4 and 5.
What is the welfare cost of maintaining a ﬁxed rate (FIX) and what are the implications
of this regime for ﬁscal policy? We address these questions by introducing the interest
rate rule (69) alongside the same simple ﬁscal rule as before. Table 8 sets out the outcome
after imposing the ZLB.27. Under FIX there is no scope for trading oﬀ the variance of
the nominal exchange rate with other macroeconomic variances that impact on welfare.
Thus the only ways of reducing the probability of hitting the lower bound are to shift
the stabilization burden onto ﬁscal policy or increase the steady state inﬂation rate. This
imposes a very large welfare losses28 in all models which as before increase as ﬁnancial
frictions are introduced. This feature is reﬂected in the very large costs of simplicity cMF
e
which rise from almost 5% to over 11% as we progress from model I to III. The higher
values for the measure of the role of ﬁscal policy, cMF
e , indicate the shift to ﬁscal means
of stabilization.
Of course faced with these results there is an alternative of full dollarization, for exam-
ple via a currency board, that would simply result in rn,t = r∗
n,t and the ZLB then ceases to
be a concern for the domestic country. However this would still leave a signiﬁcant welfare
losses only slightly lower that those of the FIX regime. These can be calculated from the
purely stochastic components of the welfare loss, ˜ Ω0 and the corresponding consumption
equivalent measures ˜ cMF







Ω0 ˜ Ω0 σ2
r π∗ [αbg, αy] Ω0 ˜ Ω0 σ2
r π∗
I 73.8 73.7 0.81 0.26 [10.0, −0.01] 84.0 83.9 0.82 0.27 0.71 4.90 0.71 4.89
II 136.2 135.4 1.07 0.66 [6.35, −0.64] 152.9 152.1 1.05 0.63 1.16 9.19 1.16 9.14
III 175.2 165.8 2.42 2.22 [7.80, 0.64] 190.9 181.9 2.37 2.17 1.09 11.13 1.12 10.47
Table 8. Welfare Outcomes under Optimized Simple Rules: FIX with a
Fiscal Rule. Models I, II and III.
27Note there is no ‘optimal’ FIX regime since the parameter θs is simply set at a value suﬃciently high
to ensure a ﬁxed exchange rate.
28It is of interest to compare these losses with ‘minimum stabilization’ that stabilizes the model economy
with a very low interest rate variability. One candidate for such a rule is ∆rn;t = 0.01πH;t alongside no
ﬁscal stabilization. Then for model I we ﬁnd Ω0 = 101, σ
2
r = 0.003 and c
SIM
e = 7.0%, an outcome rather
worse than the FIX regime. Thus the latter provides some stabilization beneﬁt.















































IMPOSITION OF ZLB: MONETARY POLICY ONLY SIMPLE RULE IN MODEL I












IMPOSITION OF ZLB: MONETARY POLICY ONLY SIMPLE RULE IN MODEL I
Figure 3: Imposition of ZLB: Flex(D) Fiscal Rule, Model I













IMPOSITION OF ZLB: M+F SIMPLE RULES IN MODEL III

































IMPOSITION OF ZLB: MONETARY POLICY ONLY SIMPLE RULE IN MODEL III












IMPOSITION OF ZLB: MONETARY POLICY ONLY SIMPLE RULE IN MODEL III
Figure 4: Imposition of ZLB: Flex(D) Fiscal Rule, Model III
35We have now established that domestic inﬂation targeting, FLEX(D), alongside a
counter-cyclical simple ﬁscal rule stabilizes the model economy far better than a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime. Two questions now remain: would a compromise ‘managed ﬂoat’ of
the type (72) improve upon FLEX(D)? How does CPI inﬂation targeting FLEX(C), the
usual form of the target, compare with FLEX(D)?
Given the very poor performance of FIX one would not expect a hybrid regime to
improve matters; nor do we expect a target that implicitly includes an element of an
exchange rate target to outperform the domestic target. Indeed we ﬁnd this to be the
case. We ﬁnd that the optimal feedback parameter in (72), θs with a ZLB imposed to be
zero across all three models. Results for FLEX(C) are reported in Table 9. These conﬁrm
the FLEX(D) is vastly superior to FLEX(C); the costs of simplicity cSIM
e now rise from
1.41% to 3.37% as we proceed from model I to model III compared with 0.12% to 2.07%
for FLEX(D). CPI as opposed to domestic inﬂation targeting has a welfare cost of over a





r π∗ [ρ, θπ, θy, αbg, αy] Ω0 σ2
r π∗ [ρ, θπ, θy]
I 23.07 1.00 0.56 [1.0,3.66,0.30,4.68,1.52] 23.64 1.01 0.56 [1.0,2.48,0.01] 0.04 1.41
II 35.29 1.50 1.23 [1.0,2.45,0.37,5.00,0.01] 36.68 1.52 1.26 [1.0,2.63,0.41] 0.10 2.24
III 62.28 2.57 2.36 [1.0,1.29,0.10,5.0,0.01] 64.01 2.66 2.45 [1.0,1.39,0.11 0.12 3.37
Table 9. Welfare Outcomes under Optimized Simple Rules: FLEX(C) with a
Fiscal Rule. Models I, II and III.
9 Conclusions
Our results provide broad support for the ‘three-pillars’ macroeconomic framework such
as that pursued by many emerging economies in the form of an explicit inﬂation target, a
ﬂoating exchange rate and a counter-cyclical ﬁscal rule as opposed to the monetary-ﬁscal
policy stance of the Indian authorities. Domestic inﬂation targeting is superior to par-
tially or fully attempting to stabilizing the exchange rate. Responding to the exchange
rate explicitly or implicitly makes it more expensive in terms of output variability to sta-
bilize inﬂation. A model corollary is that stabilizing domestic inﬂation (e.g., measured by
changes in the producer price index) enhances welfare outcomes somewhat, since stabiliz-
ing changes in the consumer price index implies a partial response to the exchange rate
36via imported consumer goods.29
Financial frictions increase the costs of stabilizing the exchange rate, as shown in GGN
and Batini et al. (2007), because the central bank cannot oﬀset a drop in net worth by
allowing the exchange rate to adjust. Emerging markets faced with ﬁnancial frictions
should thus ‘fear to ﬁx’ rather than ‘fear to ﬂoat’.
Results for optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy compared with monetary stabilization
alone indicate that potentially ﬁscal stabilization can have a signiﬁcant role and more so
if there are ﬁnancial frictions. However the ability of best simple optimized counterpart to
mimic the optimal policy deteriorates sharply as we ﬁrst introduce the ﬁnancial accelerator
in model II and then liability dollarization in model III. This suggests that future research
should explore alternative rules that respond to indicators of ﬁnancial stress such as the
risk premium facing ﬁrms in capital markets or the international risk premium facing
households or the asset price (Tobin’s Q in our model – see Bernanke and Gerler (1999)).
Also relaxing the ‘shared burden and gain principle’ for the lump-sum tax on and the
transfers to Ricardian and non-Ricardian households respectively, by choosing two separate
rules would potentially improve the performance on the ﬁscal side. Furthermore, given the
sharp deterioration of the stabilization performance of both optimal policy and optimized
rules as LD is introduced, future developments of the model could usefully attempt to
endogenize the decision to borrow in diﬀerent currencies.30 Finally, although we have
drawn upon consistent Bayesian-ML estimates (BMLE) for shocks using Indian data for
the core model, and US data for the ROW, a BMLE of all three variants of the model, using
data from a number of emerging SOEs, would both indicate the empirical importance of
various ﬁnancial frictions and enhance our assessment of the implications for policy.31
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Figure 5: A Credit Crunch: Impulse Responses to a 1% External Finance
Premium AR1 Shock ϵP,t+1 = 0.95ϵP,t.
42